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Abstract—Internet of Things (IoT) forms the foundation of next generation infrastructures, enabling development of future cities that
are inherently sustainable. Intrusion detection for such paradigms is a non-trivial challenge which has attracted further significance due
to extraordinary growth in the volume and variety of security threats for such systems. However, due to unique characteristics of such
systems i.e., battery power, bandwidth and processor overheads and network dynamics, intrusion detection for IoT is a challenge,
which requires taking into account the trade-off between detection accuracy and performance overheads. In this context, we are
focused at highlighting this trade-off and its significance to achieve effective intrusion detection for IoT. Specifically, this paper presents
a comprehensive study of existing intrusion detection systems for IoT systems in three aspects: computational overhead, energy
consumption and privacy implications. Through extensive study of existing intrusion detection approaches, we have identified open
challenges to achieve effective intrusion detection for IoT infrastructures. These include resource constraints, attack complexity,
experimentation rigor and unavailability of relevant security data. Further, this paper is envisaged to highlight contributions and
limitations of the state-of-the-art within intrusion detection for IoT, and aid the research community to advance it by identifying
significant research directions.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are typically highly intercon-
nected systems which are integrated to deliver novel func-
tionalities in diverse disciplines such as healthcare, manu-
facturing, defence and energy [1]. Evolution of technologies
such as 5G, artificial intelligence, and Internet of Things
(IoT) has a profound role in this. These advancements
have led to development of emerging paradigms such as
smart cities, smart grids, and smart factories, which have
contributed towards improving the overall quality of life
in an efficient and cost-effective manner. Although this is
still an emerging area, a number of early applications have
demonstrated potential benefits of adopting this technolog-
ical paradigm. For instance, smart grids enable improved
management and maintenance of a countrys electric grid
in a cost effective manner by incorporating smart elements
throughout the power generation, distribution and con-
sumption chain.
The evolution of smart cities and the role of CPS in this
development is underpinned by IoT which are critical in
realizing the next generation of infrastructures to develop
technological solutions in a sustainable manner. Within this
context, the ability of smart devices to communicate using
internet connectivity is of fundamental significance, which
has enabled IoT to achieve connected infrastructures.
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However, the open network architecture of IoT has also
attracted significant increase in malicious threats for smart
infrastructures as identified by [2], [3]. Furthermore, a recent
study by Gartner [4] has predicted IoT-based attacks to form
25% of all enterprise attacks by 2020, highlighting the need
for distinct protection mechanisms. Due to the proliferation
of such devices in almost every aspect of our life, the
threats posed due to their insufficient security are unique,
as insecure devices expose end users to serious security
and privacy threats. For instance, if an attacker is able to
compromise an in-car WiFi; in-car devices and data will be
at risk. Once inside the car’s network, an attacker can spoof
the car, connect to outside data sources, and steal the owners
personal information including credit card data [5].
In view of such emerging threats, the need to address
security challenges for infrastructures underpinning smart
cities is paramount [6]. There have been a number of efforts
to address different dimensions of security for IoT such as
secure frameworks [7], [8], privacy of information [9], and
authentication [10]. However, the challenge in the design
of an effective secure system is two-fold: firstly, the devices
which form these systems are typically resource constrained
limiting their ability to implement sophisticated security
management system to monitor device activities in real
time; secondly, the ad-hoc nature of IoT systems allows
devices to connect to other devices at run-time, typically for
short time periods, thereby creating a collaborative network.
Therefore, efforts to address security challenges for IoT
systems should take into account these factors to ensure
effectiveness and applicability.
Intrusion detection system (IDS) is one of the funda-
mental components of a typical security architecture, which
provides visibility into the activities of a system, enabling
2timely detection and response to any undesired events. An
IDS can be categorized into the following main approaches:
misuse/signature-based detection systems, behavioural or
anomaly-based detection, specification-based intrusion de-
tection, and hybrid intrusion detection systems [11]–[13].
Moreover, intrusion detection can be performed at the net-
work or host level typically driven by the security policy
of the monitored system. In recent years, IDS for IoT have
received increased attention with number of notable efforts
such as [14]–[17]. Within this context, the focus of our re-
search is to investigate novel challenges to achieve efficient
intrusion detection for IoT systems and explore potential
solutions to address them. In particular, we emphasize the
challenge of intrusion detection efficiency with respect to
performance metrics such as CPU, energy and bandwidth
utilization, and the trade-off with measures, such as de-
tection accuracy, false positives and false negatives. This
paper presents outcomes of our study of the state-of-the-art
with respect to intrusion detection within IoT, identifying
limitations of current approaches and highlighting future
directions.
1.1 Scope of Survey and Contributions
Our research has identified existing efforts to study the state
of the art for intrusion detection within IoT systems with
[18], [19] and [20] being the most notable efforts. Although
these efforts present a structured analysis of existing liter-
ature within IoT intrusion detection domain, these share a
significant limitation in being agnostic of the performance
overhead and privacy implications. For instance, using the
interaction ability proposed by [18], Jun and Chi [21] scores
high (three) indicating its efficiency to protect an IoT system.
However, a deeper analysis of the system highlights that it
is remarkably CPU intensive, which will affect its suitability
for an IoT system. A detailed analysis of existing studies into
intrusion detection for IoT is presented in section 2. In view
of these limitations, we undertake rigorous analysis of the
intrusion detection systems taking into account a number of
performance metrics to present an exhaustive evaluation of
existing approaches for intrusion detection in IoT systems.
In view of the limitations of existing studies, this paper
makes following contributions:
• A comprehensive attack model for IoT systems is
presented that is envisaged to inform state of the art
for intrusion detection within IoT. The attack model
comprises of threats across different dimensions of
an IoT system aiming to aid improved classification.
• An extensive review of efforts with respect to intru-
sion detection for IoT systems is conducted. Extend-
ing the state of the art, this paper takes into account
critical attributes, such as performance overhead and
privacy implications.
• Identification of open challenges to achieve effective
intrusion detection for IoT systems. This is informed
by extensive review and analysis of existing intrusion
detection research within IoT systems, and highlights
significant research directions.
Rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
includes a detailed discussion about the existing surveys of
intrusion detection research within IoT highlighting unan-
swered questions. Section 3 introduces a comprehensive
attack model for IoT systems. Extensive review of existing
literature within intrusion detection for IoT is presented in
Section 4 which is organized into different types of IDS and
therefore provides a linkage with classification introduced
in Section 3. Section 5 presents privacy implications of
intrusion detection systems followed by 6, which provides a
thorough analysis of the existing literature with respect to a
number of attributes including intrusion detection and per-
formance efficiency. Through the findings of our research,
section 7 discusses open challenges which require further
attention followed by conclusions and future aims of our
research in section 8.
2 EXISTING SURVEYS OF INTRUSION DETECTION
FOR IOT
With the evolution of IoT and its application, the volume
and variety of attacks for such systems have increased
requiring dedicated efforts to investigate intrusion detec-
tion systems for IoT systems. Furthermore, IoT paradigm
shares similarities with concepts, such as Mobile Adhoc
Networks (MANETs) and Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN).
Consequently, a number of studies have been performed to
review state of the art within intrusion detection for these
paradigms. For instance, [22]–[24] presented state of the art
with respect to IDS for the MANETs, whereas [25], [26] have
reviewed existing IDSs for WSNs. However, our focus in
this paper is solely on the intrusion detection approaches for
the IoT system taking into account unique characteristics of
this paradigm.
Our research has identified [18], [19], [20], and [27]
as existing efforts to review literature related to intrusion
detection for IoT. A comprehensive analysis of these surveys
is discussed below and summarized in Table 1, which also
highlights limitation of these efforts to take into account
performance overheads of existing intrusion detection ap-
proaches for IoT.
Gendreau et al. [18] defined a term called Interaction
Ability of an IDS to assess the level of holistic detection in-
telligence. This parameter is defined as the ability of an IDS
to interact with different service layers within the system
i.e. Network Interface, Internet, Transport and Application
layers with maximum achievable interaction ability score
as four. Authors have attempted to review seven recent
intrusion detection systems against the interaction ability
metric to identify respective efficiency. Although interaction
ability is a useful indicator, however, we believe the IoT
intrusion detection landscape requires rigorous analysis of
existing efforts. For instance, one of the unique features
of IoT systems is their resource constraints and interaction
ability is agnostic of this significant characteristic. For in-
stance, although Jun and Chi [21] scores high (three) for
interaction ability, indicating its efficiency to protect a IoT
system however, a deeper analysis of the system highlights
that it is remarkably CPU intensive which will affect its
suitability for a typical IoT system.
Zarpelao et al. [19] presented a recent survey of IDS
research efforts for IoT aiming to identify leading trends,
open issues, and future research possibilities. The authors
3Survey ID Detection Approaches Review Criteria Performance
Efficiency Considered
Gendreau et al [18] Rule and Anomaly-based Holistic Detection
Intelligence
No
Zarpelao et al. [19] Anomaly, Signature and
Hyrbid
Security Threats &
Validation Strategies
No
Chaabouni et al [20] Network-based IDS Threats, Placement,
Validation Strategies
No
Kiennert et al. [27] Game Theory-based IDS TPR, FPR, FNR, TNR No
This Study Anomaly, Signature,
Specification & Hybrid
Security and Perfor-
mance Metrics
Yes
TABLE 1: Analysis of existing reviews of IDS for IoT
classified existing intrusion detection efforts based on de-
tection method, IDS placement strategy, security threat and
validation strategy. Although the authors present a com-
prehensive system to analyze existing intrusion detection
efforts, however, similar to [18], this effort is agnostic of
the performance overhead of intrusion detection systems.
Chaabouni et al [20] presented a multidimensional review
of efforts to achieve effective network based IDS for IoT.
The study is significant as it presents a comparative review
of existing NIDS tools and datasets available, which can
help IoT security practitioners to evaluate different tools
available. Furthermore, the authors have presented a brief
review of select academic efforts for NIDS however the
review is focused on security characteristics of these systems
with limited coverage of literature and performance metrics.
In addition to the above, Kiennert et al. [27] studied
game-theoretic approaches to intrusion detection within IoT
systems, highlighting limitations of using game theory and
Markov decision processes to perform effective intrusion de-
tection. Authors conducted a comparative study of existing
intrusion detection approaches analyzing metrics, such as
true positive, false positive, true negative and false negative
to assess the performance of the individual schemes. As
with the other studies discussed earlier, authors do not take
into account the performance characteristics of intrusion
detection systems and therefore do not address the gap
highlighted in this paper.
In summary, although existing surveys of intrusion de-
tection for IoT highlight advancements and open challenges,
these do not consider performance efficiency of IDS for
IoT which is significant due to limited resources for these
devices, such as CPU, memory, storage, bandwidth and
battery. This paper is focused at addressing this gap and
presents a thorough analysis of existing IDS efforts for
IoT taking into consideration performance metrics, such as
energy consumption, RAM, and CPU usage for these efforts.
3 SECURITY THREATS FOR IOT SYSTEMS
Although IoT is an emerging paradigm, a significant part of
the software stack used by the IoT applications is adopted
from existing software paradigms. This is also evident from
the concept of integrating IoT specific stack (for instance,
specific to Zigbee, 6LoWPAN and RPL) with the existing
Internet infrastructure, such as IPv5 and IPv6. This has
significant implications with respect to the attack surface for
IoT infrastructures as it is not restricted to the threats specific
to the new routing protocols, such as 6LoWPAN and RPL
but also includes threats to existing infrastructure, such as
IPv6, application specific attacks and attacks specific to the
physical media, such as the radio spectrum. We present a
taxonomy of different attacks for a typical IoT system and
summarize in Fig 2.
3.1 Routing-specific threats
Routing information in an IoT system can be modified or
spoofed in order to route the traffic in a malicious manner
or to launch a further attack on the IoT network. These
attacks are the most common in resource-constrained IoT
networks. The most relevant routing attacks in IoT include
the following:
Rank attack: A defining characteristic of 6LoWPAN
networks is the use of ranking to establish optimal routing
path. Within this context, Node Rank indicates the quality of
the path from a node to the sink node. Every time a node
updates its rank or preferred parent, it is required to inform
other nodes by sending the updated information in the next
Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) Information Object (DIO).
RPL uses the Rank rule i.e. a node in the parent should always
have lower rank than its children to prevent the loop creation.
In this way, the rank enables creating optimal topology,
preventing loop creation and managing control overhead
[28]. As identified by [28]–[30] the rank information can
be maliciously tampered with by an attacker such that it
chooses the node with worst Rank to be its parent. This will
therefore result in disturbing the topology of the network,
thereby causing delays in normal transmission.
Wormhole attack: A wormhole can be considered as a
tunnel between two nodes using wired or wireless links and
can be used to achieve faster transmission rates or dedicated
connection between such nodes. As such, wormhole has
legitimate applications, such as the connection between
the local and global IDS modules within our architecture.
However, wormhole can be used by an attacker to create a
dedicated tunnel with a node on the Internet as identified
by [31]. Wormhole attack is not novel to the IoT systems
and has been historically identified as a potential threat for
wireless sensor networks by [32]–[34].
Sinkhole attack: The objective of a sinkhole attack is to
attract traffic through a designated node using illegitimate
information making the node a lucrative routing sink (base
station within a wireless network). As with the wormhole
attack, literature around sinkhole attack is well established
with [35] being an initial effort to identify and mitigate
against such attack. Creating a sinkhole does not necessarily
disrupt legitimate transmission within a 6LoWPAN, how-
ever, by diverting the traffic through a specific route creates
opportunities to launch other attacks, such as wormhole and
selective forwarding attack described below.
Selective forwarding attack: With selective forwarding
attack, a malicious node attempts to disrupt legitimate
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transmission and routing path. The malicious node in this
case attempts to block certain packets and forward selected
packets, thereby affecting the routing to fulfil malicious
objectives. For instance, an attacker can forward all RPL
control messages but block the remaining messages [31]. As
can be inferred, this attack can cause more damage when
used in conjunction with sinkhole attack. Consequently,
such dependencies among different attack types has moti-
vated us to explore the impact of multi-stage attacks within
IoT infrastructures with our initial efforts in this respect
presented in [36].
Fragment duplication attack: The fragment duplication
attack leverages a weakness within the 6LoWPAN layer
with respect to how fragmented packets are received and
assembled by an IoT node. Due to the integration of 6LoW-
PAN with IPv6 networks, larger packets supported by IPv6
have to be fragmented into smaller packets so as to be effec-
tively processed by the resource-constrained nodes within
an IoT system. However, as identified by [37], a recipient
node cannot verify if two fragments of a packet were sent
by the same source, therefore, the recipient node is unable
to distinguish between legitimate and spoofed fragments.
A malicious node can exploit this vulnerability to block
reassembly of targeted packets, such as connection estab-
lishment packets. This may result in disrupting legitimate
traffic as well as consuming resources available to the victim
node.
Buffer reservation attack: The buffer reservation attack
is closely linked to the fragment duplication attack and
may be caused as a consequence of a successful fragment
duplication attack. The buffer reservation attack also targets
the vulnerability in the fragmentation mechanism employed
by 6LoWPAN networks. As identified by [37], it leverages
the fact that the recipient of a fragmented packet is unable
to determine if all fragments will be received correctly.
Therefore, a recipient node reserves a buffer space based on
the information provided in the 6LoWPAN header with any
additional fragments discarded. Taking advantage of this
setting, a malicious node can send a victim single FRAG1
to reserve arbitrary buffer space thereby consuming scarce
memory of the resource-constrained node.
Sybil and clone ID attack: Sybil and Clone ID attacks
are similar in that the objective of the attacker is to use
spoofed logical identities within a network without de-
ploying physical devices. In particular, for Clone ID attack,
an attacker aims to use a victims logical identity within
the network whereas in Sybil attack, the attacker aims to
assume multiple logical identities within a network without
deploying physical nodes. These logical identities may not
be currently present in the network. A number of existing
efforts, such as [31], [35] have identified these attacks for IoT
and historically for wireless sensor networks.
3.2 Application specific threats
Although routing forms an essential component of the IoT
system, the IoT devices are expected to run application soft-
ware required by the function envisaged to be performed,
such as temperature monitoring and supply chain manage-
ment. We categorize these threats as application specific and
present them below.
Denial of Service attack: Historically, Denial of Service
(DoS) attacks are targeted at making the victim unavailable
for legitimate service. This can be achieved by flooding the
victim with extraordinarily large volume of requests or by
exhausting resources, such as memory and computational
power available to the victim. Within IoT, the threat of DoS
attack is two-fold; the victim can be part of the network
under threat that an attacker wishes to make unavailable, or
the victim can be used as a zombie to launch a Distributed
DoS (DDoS) on a target IoT network. In this context, Botnet
attacks targeting IoT devices have recently attracted signifi-
cant attention with Mirai [38] the pioneer Botnet attack. The
significance of these threats within IoT systems have been
identified by [39]–[41].
Malicious code injection: As identified by [40], [42], ma-
licious code injection is another application specific threat
to IoT systems. The attacker, in this case, attempts to inject
malicious code to get privileged access to the victim. Con-
sequently, the attacker can damage the normal operation by
causing threat to the data or to the network using one of the
routing specific attacks described in the previous section.
3.3 Traditional attacks
In addition to the above mentioned attacks, IoT systems
are vulnerable to the existing attacks targeted at computer
systems, such as message interception, fabrication, mod-
ification, subversion and phishing. As with the routing-
specific attacks, these attacks can also form a part of a more
complicated/sophisticated attack and therefore require ef-
forts to protect against them.
54 STATE OF THE ART IN IDS FOR IOT
Through our research, we have identified that intrusion
detection research for IoT systems can be categorized into:
Anomaly, Signature, Specification, Hybrid, and Game-based
models. Therefore, we present review of existing efforts us-
ing these categorization. In doing so, we summarize leading
efforts for each category of intrusion detection which can
indicate the cutting-edge within that domain.
4.1 Anomaly-based approaches to intrusion detection
With the notable advancements within the domains of ar-
tificial intelligence, machine learning and deep learning,
anomaly-based approaches have been increasingly used for
intrusion detection in general and for IoT in particular.
Nobakht et al. [43] proposed a host-based IDS using Soft-
ware Defined Technology (SDN) for smart homes. The au-
thors have defined three basic requirements for an efficient
IDS for IoT i.e. unobtrusive approach, negligible overheads,
and scalability. The proposed approach uses sensors to host
the intrusion detection module, which is envisioned to mon-
itor network traffic visible at an IoT device. The detection
can be performed using a choice of detection modules i.e.
signature, anomaly or specification-based techniques. The
authors claim that hosting the intrusion detection module
within an IoT device reduces the communication overhead,
however, it increases the processing overhead at the IoT
device, which is critical for such low powered devices.
In [44], Chordia and Gupta proposed an anomaly-based
IDS aiming to reduce false alarm rates and increase detec-
tion efficiency using data mining techniques. The proposed
system aims to monitor network traffic and uses techniques,
such as K-NN, K-Means and Decision Table Majority Rule-
based scheme focusing on U2R ,R2R ,DoS and Probe attacks.
The authors have used KDD99 dataset to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of the approach, which highlights the unavailability
of security events data from an IoT system to aid more
rigorous and proportionate evaluation of IDS systems for
IoT.
Khan and Herrmann [45] proposed intrusion detection
for IoT via a trust management mechanism that collects
information about neighboring devices and their reputation.
The authors investigated patterns of normal use for the RPL
protocol using these to devise trust among the IoT devices
and the edge routers. The trust management algorithms
devised as part of this approach aim to develop trust and
reputation values, which are used to protect against routing-
specific attacks, such as sinkhole, selective forwarding and
version number. Similarly, [46] proposed a distributed IDS
where each node monitors the working of nearby nodes
for any abnormal activity. If some abnormality is detected,
its packets are blocked and problem is reported to the
parent node or root node by Distress Propagation Object
(DPO). The system has three subsystems i.e. Monitoring and
Grading Subsystem (MGSS), Reporting Subsystem (RSS)
and Isolated Subsystem (ISS), which enable collaboration
between an IoT device and edge router to facilitate IoT
threat detection effectively.
Zhang et al. [47] proposed a hierarchical and distributed
IDS (SGDIDS) that is focused at protection against cyber-
physical attacks for smart grids systems. The proposed
system leverages classification algorithms, such as support
vector machine (SVM) and artificial immune system (AIS)
in order to determine occurrence of an attack, its type, and
its origin in the communication system. The SGDIDS shares
some similarities with a typical IoT network in that an IoT
network can be divided into two levels i.e. IoT devices
and the edge routers with the possibility to adopt SGDIDS
approach for a hierarchical IDS. Furthermore, the attack
surface for smart grids overlaps significantly with that for a
typical IoT network therefore the results of this research are
relevant within a generic IDS for IoT.
[15] presented a network anomaly-based model for in-
trusion detection and two tier classification model, which
is proposed to be used in IoT backbone networks. The
authors have focused on two specific attack types i.e. User
to Root (U2R) and Root to Local (R2L) demonstrating high
detection accuracy with low false positive rates primarily
due to introduction of a refinement feature and decreased
computational complications. The authors have used both
supervised and unsupervised reduction techniques, such as
Linear Discriminant Analysis LDA(supervised) and Princi-
pal Component Analysis PCA (unsupervised), where PCA
is used for feature selection and extraction, and LDA pro-
vides fast and efficient IDS. In [48], Summerville et al. pre-
sented a deep packet anomaly detection system involving
feature selection conducted by pattern matching. The au-
thors focused on two Internet-enabled devices i.e. a weather
station and an interactive networked video camera, which
simulate as sensor and actuator respectively. The evaluation
of the approach demonstrated that the sensor was able
to detect 99.9% of abnormal packets whereas IoT actuator
demonstrated 92.9% detection accuracy.
A user-centric approach is proposed in [49] consisting of
two major blocks i.e. a habit-based approach for anomaly
detection system and semantic-based firewall for access
control and security during communication. The authors
consider use of IoT devices within a private setting, such as
home networks with devices, including a wrist bracelet, a
connected light bulb and a smart TV to model various user
behaviours. Within this context, the authors focus on the
personal data collected and communicated by the devices.
The authors do not discuss details of the detection accuracy,
performance efficiency, visibility for the intrusion detection
and its placement. Yang et al. [50] propose using Bayesian
Spatial Temporal (HBST) model to achieve effective and
timely detection of a compromised node at an early stage.
The system achieves high detection rate and low false posi-
tives rates with low detection samples.
As with other domains of computer and information
security, recent efforts for intrusion detection have also
attempted to leverage advancements in machine learning
and artificial intelligence to improve efficiency and accuracy
of the detection process. In this regard, Meidan et al. [51]
present one of the first efforts focusing on protection against
the IoT botnets which are one of the emerging threats for
IoT systems. The authors use deep learning autoencoders to
establish an anomaly detection engine which is evaluated
against two major botnets i.e. Mirai and BASHLITE. With
respect to placement of the IDS, authors use a hybrid
approach where by a central unit coordinates with device
level encoders (each encoder is responsible for profiling
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individual IoT device).
Similarly, authors in [52] use deep learning to achieve
effective detection of IoT botnets. Furthermore, both ap-
proaches are similar in that they use patterns within net-
work traffic to discover anomalous behavior representing
infection caused by botnets. In terms of placement of the
intrusion detection system, the authors have adopted a
network-based approach employing deep packet inspection
techniques. Moreover, Pandu et al. [53] presented an effort
to achieve efficient intrusion detection and prevention for
IoT systems. Authors have proposed an integrated system
for detection and response with specific attention on direct-
ing attacks, such as hi surge, sinkhole and wormhole attacks.
Although the proposed system has been implemented with
Contiki, evaluation results especially with respect to perfor-
mance efficiency are not available.
4.2 Signature-based approaches to intrusion detection
Signature-based techniques for intrusion detection are well-
established especially for conventional computing systems.
However, one of the critical factors for effectiveness of such
schemes is the availability of trustworthy dataset simulating
patterns/signatures of misuse, which has proved to be a
challenge for IoT systems. In this respect, Kasinathan et al.
[54] presented an IDS framework for 6LoWPAN focusing on
detecting denial of service attacks by monitoring physical
parameters of the device. The proposed IDS leverages exist-
ing IDS (Surricata) and monitors network traffic for both
signatures and abnormal behaviour to identify malicious
users to detect flooding attacks with an increased detection
rate.
Forzin et al. [55] proposed leveraging Snort, a contempo-
rary signature-based NIDS, to establish a portable, easy to
use intrusion detection for IoT networks. The resultant IDS
is packaged within a Raspberry Pi so it can be transported
with the device, enabling it to work in collaboration to
achieve detection of sophisticated attacks, such as those
targeting network topology. Under this setup, an IDS node
can request data captured by neighboring nodes to perform
rigorous analysis and reduce false positives. In view of the
increasing threats for IoT systems with respect to volume
and sophistication, this observation will be crucial to an
effective intrusion detection for IoT systems. Indre and
Lemnaru [56] proposed a modular architecture for intru-
sion detection, which utilizes detection techniques, such as
7signature, anomaly and specification-based systems with
network traffic to achieve effective detection. In particu-
lar, signature-based detection uses rules based on packet
headers whereas anomaly-based detection aims to identify
abnormal data patterns, and specification-based detection
focuses on botnet detection. However, the proposed ap-
proach envisages intrusion detection at the edge router level
which compromises visibility of the system.
4.3 Game-based approaches to intrusion detection
Wang et al. [57] proposed an attack-defence game model to
detect malicious nodes using repeated-game approach. The
authors claim to have developed a tree model, which is used
to formulate an optimal solution to the error detection prob-
lems focusing on the detection strategy and performance
overhead for individual IoT devices. This is achieved by
developing a repeated game method where attackers and
defenders can alter strategies to achieve maximum pay-offs.
The authors do not discuss challenges, such as placement
of the IDS module, type of the detection engine and the
level of visibility, which can contribute towards the overall
effectiveness of an IDS for IoT networks.
La et al. [58] proposed a honeypot-based approach to
improve defence against malicious attempts within an IoT
infrastructure. In order to strengthen the defence, authors
proposed using a game theoretic model with the defender
using honeypot to deceive the attacker. The proposed sys-
tem focuses on scenarios where the attacker is not known
to the defender, therefore, the system does not take into
account attempts, such as Rank Attack, which can be ini-
tiated by an insider node known to the system. The pro-
posed system is designed and implemented in isolation
to the specific challenges and requirements of the IoT in-
frastructures, such as the resource constraints, interactions
between different IoT devices and the positioning of the
system. The authors presented experimentation performed
in Matlab, which models the overall concept of the system.
We believe this to be a limitation, as an effective intrusion
detection mechanism for IoT systems should ideally take
into account the unique characteristics of such systems as
those explained above.
4.4 Specification-based approaches to intrusion detec-
tion
Fu et al. [59] propose an IDS for Internet of Vehicles (IoV) i.e.
an open and integrated network system connecting human
intelligence, vehicles, things, environments and the Internet.
Authors explain fundamental requirements for an IDS for
IoV i.e. host protection via detection, constrained resources,
and real-time detection. Through our research, we have
identified these characteristics to be shared by a typical
IoT system. Due to these requirements, conventional IDS
is not feasible for IoT as it incurs significant overhead with
respect to required resources and processing time. In order
to fulfil these requirements, an FPGA-based IDS is proposed
by [59] which can work in real time, however, it limits
versatility of the approach as it is unclear if the system can
be translated for other hardware. In [60] a Complex Event
Processing (CEP)-based approach to intrusion detection for
IoT is proposed with the aim to provide low latency and real
time processing of security events. Although the use of CEP
for intrusion detection is not novel, it is rather innovative
concept within intrusion detection for IoT and this work
can be considered as a means to assess the feasibility of CEP
within IoT. The proposed system is developed as a rule-
based IDS which collects network traffic data from the edge
router, extracts events from this data and performs intrusion
detection. Although the discussion of the approach is not
detailed, we believe CEP can be explored further to address
sophisticated or coordinated attacks within IoT which are a
combination of simple attack steps.
Amaral et al. [61] present a network-based intrusion
detection system for Internet-connected WSN which share
close similarities with a typical IoT network. The authors
adopted a distributed approach to their design in that
the IDS is deployed as a module on randomly selected
devices called watchdogs over a WSN, reporting to a cen-
tralised Event Management System (EMS). Although the
IDS module is deployed on individual devices, it only
monitors network traffic visible at the node. However, as
the watchdogs devices are heterogeneous in location and
function, this may have an impact on the types of threats
encountered at a specific device. Therefore, each watchdog
device is pre-configured with custom monitoring rules,
which are designed to detect specific threats expected to be
encountered by a device. We believe that the distributed
approach adopted by the authors is symmetric with the
inherent characteristics of a typical IoT network, however,
the role of EMS is limited to information collection limiting
its ability to monitor the overall state of a network and to
detect coordinated attacks.
Le et al. [62] presented one of the early efforts to establish
an IDS for IoT where authors proposed a host-based IDS
for LoWPANs using Contiki OS and 6LowPAN [63], [64].
The proposed IDS is able to perform detection based on
the information at the node-level which is transmitted to a
centralized system for further analysis. The proposed sys-
tem limits detection to events monitored at the individual
devices and does not demonstrate effective detection under
DDoS attacks, which not only overwhelm the device but
also congest the communication channel between nodes and
the centralized system.
Mudgerikar et al. [65] is one of the recent attempts to
achieve intrusion detection for IoT where authors present
an interesting approach which is similar to COLIDE project
[17], [36] in that both advocate collaboration between sensor
and edge devices to achieve effective intrusion detection.
Authors have presented details of their implementation of
the host component, which performs behavioral analysis
to identify malicious attempts represented by the system
calls executed by processes within a device. Although au-
thors recognize the significance of performance costs for
IoT devices, the evaluation reports performance in terms
of computational costs, which does not provide in-depth
insight into the performance efficiency of the proposed
scheme. Sharma et al. [66] has proposed a specification-
based approach for IoT intrusion detection aiming to protect
against zero-day attacks. The authors argue that by using
a specification-based approach, the proposed IDS achieves
higher detection accuracy as well as performance efficiency
(memory and communication overhead) whilst achieving
8protection against previously unknown attacks. Although
the authors have presented detailed analysis of their ap-
proach as well as performance with respect to detection
accuracy, FPR and FNR, however, they have not included
metrics to demonstrate performance efficiency of the pro-
posed IDS.
9TABLE 2: Comparative analysis of existing IDS approaches for IoT
Paper Visibility Time Detection En-
gine
Architecture Performance
Overhead
Attack Types Detection Perfor-
mance
Scalability
Midi et
al. [14]
Network Offline Hybrid Collaborative CPU usage:0.19%,
RAM usage
(KB)=13978.62%
ICMP Flooding, SMURF Detection Rate: 91%,
Accuracy: 100%
Yes
Fu et al.
[59]
Network Realtime Specification-
based
Distributed Latency: 4.12us, power
consumption: 7.5w
Buffer overflow, prob-
ing, finger printing
Not available Yes
Kasi.et
al. [54]
Network Offline Signature-
based
Distributed Not available DoS Accuracy:100% Limited
Forzin et
al. [55]
Network Combined Signature-
based
Distributed CPU usage: 100% for
70Mb/s, RAM usage:
475MB
IP Spoofing Not available Limited
Nobakth
et al. [43]
Host Realtime Hybrid Distributed Not available Masquareding Accuracy: 94.25%, Re-
call: 85.05%
Limited
Chordia
et al. [44]
Network Offline Anomaly-
based
Centralised CPU usage: 49% U2R, R2L, DoS, Probe Accuracy: 95.55%, De-
tection rate: 93.67%,
FPR: 0.019
No
Jun et
al.[60]
Network Realtime Specification
based
Centralised CPU usage: 48%, RAM
usage: 684MB, pro-
cessing time: 368ms
Generic Not available No
Khan et
al. [45]
Network Offline Anomaly-
based
Distributed Not available routing-specific attacks:
sinkhole, selective for-
warding and version
number
For 300 nodes:
FNR=26%, FPR=47%,
Detection Rate= 50%
Yes
Indre et
al. [56]
Network Offline Hybrid Centralised Not available Probing and DoS Detection Accu-
racy=98.4%
No
Thani. et
al. [46]
Network Offline Anomaly-
based
Distributed Not available Neighbouring node dis-
crepancy
Not available Yes
Amaral
et al. [61]
Network Offline Specification
based
Distributed Not available Signature mismatching Not available Yes
Zhang et
al. [47]
Network Offline Anomaly-
based
Distributed Not available DoS, U2R, R2L FPR: 0.67, 0.7 and
1.3. FNR: 2.15, 21.02,
26.32%
Yes
Haddad
et al.[15]
Network Offline Anomaly-
based
Centralised Not available U2R and R2L Detection accuracy:
81.97% and FPR: 5.44%
No
Summ.
et al. [48]
Network Offline Anomaly-
based
Distributed Not available Worm propagation, tun-
neling, SQL code injec-
tion
Detection accuracy:
100%
Yes
Tamani
et al. [49]
Network Offline Anomaly-
based
Distributed Not available Privacy Threats Not available Yes
Wang et
al. [57]
Network Offline Game theory Distributed Energy consumption:
avg 2.0J for 300 nodes,
Energy consumption:
avg 2.0J for 300 nodes
Not available Detection accuracy:
avg. 80%
Yes
Yang et
al. [50]
Network Offline Anomaly-
based
Not available Energy consumption:
8,48mJ
Not available Not
available
Sedje. et
al. [67]
Network Offline Hybrid Distributed Efficiency: 2s, energy
consumption: approx
3000 mj for 300 nodes
DoS Detection accuracy
92% for large number
of nodes. FPR: 3%
Yes
Raza et
al. [16]
Network Realtime Hybrid Distributed efficiecny: ¿150000mj
for 64 nodes
sinkhole and selective
forwarding attacks
TPR: approx 80% for
30 nodes on avg.
Yes
Le et al.
[62]
Network Realtime Specification-
based
Hybrid energy consumption:
202J, power
consumption: 6.3%
increase (1.2mW)
Rank, sinkhole and
neighbour attacks
TPR: 100%, FPR: ap-
prix: 3% avg
Yes
Mayza.
et al. [68]
Network Offline Other Distributed Not available version number attacks FPR: 0% for some sim-
ulations
Yes
Arshad
et al. [69]
Both Offline Hybrid Collaborative energy consumption:
avg 8.5mW for 1, 10,
100 and 1000 pack-
ets/sec
Generic Not available Yes
Meidan
et al. [51]
Network Offline Anomaly-
based
Distributed Not available Botnets TPR: 100%, FPR: 0.007, Yes
McDermott
et al. [52]
Network Offline Anomaly-
based
Centralized Not available Botnets Detection Accuracy:
Mirai: 99%, UDP:98%,
DNS: 98%
No
Pandu et
al. [53]
Network Offline Anomaly-
based
Centralized Not available hi surge, sinkhole &
wormhole attacks
Not available No
Mudgerikar
et al. [65]
Host Offline Specification-
based
Distributed Defined as High,
Medium & Low
Computational Costs
Multiple IoT attacks Ranging between 79%
and 100% for different
modules
Yes
Sharma
et al. [66]
Network Offline Specification-
based
Centralized Not available zero-day attacks Avg. FNR: 0.137. Avg.
FPR: 0.045, Avg. TPR:
0.863
Limited
Li et al.
[70]
Network Offline Feature
Extraction
Centralized Not available DoS, U2R, R2L, Probe.
Using KDD99 Data
DoS: 99.91%, Probe:
96.63%, R2L: 83.33%.
Not avail-
able
Bassey et
al. [71]
RF Traces Offline RF Signatures Centralized Not available Device impersonation AMI: 0.56 to 0.79,
Rand Index: 0.41 to
0.70
Not avail-
able
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4.5 Hybrid approaches to intrusion detection
In addition to the approaches discussed earlier, current
literature in this domain also includes efforts which com-
bine multiple different approaches to achieve effective de-
tection. In this respect, Midi et al. [14] proposed a self-
adapting, knowledge-driven expert Intrusion Detection Sys-
tem (KALIS) which can improve its performance after
evaluating its efficiency. It is focused on network features
and its protocols to improve detection efficiency. KALIS
automatically collects the information about the features
and configures most suitable detection technique. All the
KALIS components run independently with support for a
wide variety of mediums and related protocols. The attacks
considered by KALIS are variants of DoS attacks i.e ICMP
Flood and SMURF which produce similar symptoms i.e.
high amount of ICMP Echo Reply Messages directed to
affect the machine.
Sedjelmaci et al. [67] proposed a hybrid approach for
intrusion detection within IoT, which combines signature
and anomaly-based techniques to achieve effective detec-
tion. The authors adopt a game theoretic approach based on
Nash Equilibrium (NE) to determine the equilibrium state
in which the IDS agent will activate its anomaly detection
technique to train, classify and build a rule related to a new
attacks signature. Furthermore, with respect to placement
of IDS, both the signature and anomaly-based detection
systems are based on individual IoT devices. The authors
explain this decision to be motivated by the objective to re-
duce the communication overhead based on the assumption
that the communication overhead is more resource-hungry
as compared to computational overhead. However, this is
expected to have significant computational overhead in the
case of zero day attacks. Furthermore, the proposed system
is limited in its visibility to the events occurring on the
individual nodes and therefore limits its ability to effectively
detect of sophisticated attacks which may be composed of
multiple steps.
Raza et al. [16] proposed Svelte which is a lightweight
hybrid intrusion detection system focused on Routing at-
tacks, such as Spoofing, Sinkhole and Selective Forwarding.
Svelte has three main modules i.e. 6LoWPAN Mapper (6
mapper), Intrusion Detection component and Distributed
Mini Firewall. Although Svelte presents a hybrid approach,
however, there are considerations that should be taken into
account. For instance, although anomaly-based intrusion
detection systems have the advantage of better detection
accuracy for zero-day attacks, they are typically resource-
hungry which can be a bottleneck when implementing them
on resource constrained IoT devices. Furthermore, known
attacks such as Rank attack, Sinkhole and spoofing are well
established leading to an established signature for their
detection. However, attacks such as multi-stage or zero-
day require analysis from a wider perspective, analyzing
behavioral and usage patterns which makes a case for using
anomaly-based IDS. Therefore, an IDS for IoT should take
these factors into consideration when making choices, such
as the type of IDS, placement and the visibility of the data.
Arshad et al. [69] presents a recent effort to address
intrusion detection for IoT systems particularly focusing
at the constrained resources available at the IoT devices.
The authors presented a collaborative approach where IDS
modules are implemented at both device and edge-router
level to improve visibility, detection rate and to reduce
false positives. The authors propose signature-based IDS
at the node level due to its performance efficiency and
anomaly-based detection at the edge-router to enhance the
detection accuracy. The approach is novel in that it proposes
a innovative solution to achieve high detection accuracy
whilst taking into account the limited resources available
at the sensor devices.
4.6 Additional intrusion detection efforts within IoT
The resource constraints in general and the limited available
of power in particular are one of the challenges for any IDS
within IoT. To this end, Gendreau [72] seek to address this
challenge by using an enhanced measurement of situation
awareness in the IoT. The authors highlight the importance
of awareness of state of monitoring system and propose a
framework to enhance the energy efficiency of a self-reliant
management and monitoring WSN cluster head selection
algorithm. Although the experimental results demonstrate
positive results for the approach, however, it is limited to
assessing the energy efficiency for a cluster head selection
algorithm and, therefore, require further efforts to assess its
impact on the monitoring capabilities of individual nodes.
Daramas et al. [73] an enhanced and safe home based
IDS HIVE is proposed having three parts i.e. a sensor
manager, firebase as cloud database and user authentication
service, and android application for monitoring, configuring
and remote notification. The proposed system is especially
design for a smart home with focus on detecting physical
intrusion into a home. HIVE aims to detect a physical
intrusion by using three sensors i.e. an infrared sensor to
detect motions, a magnetic switch sensor to detect status of
a door or window and a load cell sensor to detect pressure
such as footsteps.
Mayzaud et al. [68] authors proposed a distributed sys-
tem architecture for detecting the version number attacks in
RPL-based networks and identifies malicious nodes. Fur-
thermore, a number of intrusion detection system archi-
tectures have been developed in [74], [75] for resource-
constrained 6LoWPAN devices-based systems focusing on
the sinkhole and selective-forwarding attacks. Golomb et al.
[76] present an innovative approach, CIOTA, to intrusion
detection for IoT leveraging blockchain technology. The pro-
posed approach is comprised of local agents and a central
component which coordinates information (alerts) received
from these agents. Authors use blockchain technology to
achieve assurances about the authenticity of alerts generated
by local agents.
Li et al. [70] presents a network-based intrusion detection
approach for IoT focusing on the task of feature extraction
for effective intrusion detection. Authors have used deep
migration learning model to develop the proposed ap-
proach and have evaluated their scheme with the KDD 1999
dataset. Although the proposed approach demonstrates
good detection accuracy as compared to existing schemes,
however, the evaluation is limited to detection accuracy,
TPR and FPR and does not take into account performance
efficiency of the proposed scheme, which is a critical metric
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due to the resource constraints of such devices. Similarly,
Bassey et al. [71] presented one of the efforts focusing at
detection of physical layer attacks on IoT networks. In par-
ticular, authors are focused at attacks whereby an attacker
attempts to impersonate a victim IoT device through the
use of Radio Frequency (RF) trace. Authors have proposed
a deep learning-based method utilizing a dataset created
through feature extraction of RF traces of similar devices to
achieve device fingerprinting.
5 PRIVACY IMPLICATIONS OF INTRUSION DETEC-
TION SYSTEMS
Intrusion detection systems are widely used to protect de-
vices and end-users from malicious actors. The performance
of these systems often depends on the type of data and
architectural setup they use while preventing the attacker
from misusing personal information of victims. The usage
of data for the intrusion detection introduces the challenges
of security and privacy. Therefore, we discuss the privacy
implications of intrusion detection systems in this section.
5.1 Type of data
Intrusion detection systems can be categorized on the basis
of network data they use to detect malicious actors. Identifi-
cation of correct data type not only affects the performance
of the system, but also has an impact on the privacy of the
users. For instance, if the detection system uses IP-address
to analyze the behavior of a device, it can be easily traced
back to the owner of this IP-address. The challenge in this
regard is two-fold: 1) identifying the data type that provides
optimum performance in terms of detection rate, and 2)
ensure protection of the privacy of the network users. The
existing intrusion detection systems use two types of data
for detecting the malicious actors i.e. 1) application layer
data logs, and 2) network traces data. The first type is data
originated at the application level and is normally associ-
ated with specific type of data set. This type of data can
provide information about the device architecture and can
help in fingerprinting malicious and non-malicious devices.
The second data-type is the IP traces of the network traffic
and contains much more details about the behavior of the
devices. Another data type that can be used is the content or
payload of the information exchanged among devices, such
as a temperature reading, a web-page, or meta data.
5.2 System architecture
An intrusion detection system for IoT can operate in two
modes i.e. 1) as the standalone system, or 2) as a collab-
orative system. The stand-alone detection systems rely on
traffic patterns observed locally within the network domain
or Internet service provider. These systems work indepen-
dently within a service provider network. The stand-alone
systems do not have any information about the behavior
of its users in other domains and, therefore, can be easily
circumvented by stealth techniques and smart attacker, such
as by controlling the attack traffic to one domain but target
large number of domains simultaneously. An effective intru-
sion detection system is envisaged to consider the collective
behaviour of nodes across different domains to facilitate
developing a collaborative network.
The collaborative solutions can be grouped in two types:
1) centralized - where alert information from the domain
collaborators is reported to the the centralized system which
classifies the behavior of traffic sender by analyzing traffic
patterns from multiple domains, or 2) The distributed or
decentralized settings - where alert information from each
service provider is shared and processed in a completely
distributed fashion without a centralized coordinator.
The major challenge towards the design of a collabora-
tive IDS is regarding privacy protections for the data used
for detection. The domain or Internet service provider are
reluctant to share operational data of their users with each
other as it risks privacy of their customers. A centralized
trusted aggregation can overcome the problem of privacy
if the centralized repository assures cooperating domain
that their provided information would not be misused and
disclosed to any one. Furthermore, use of cryptographic
methods or addition of noise data can be considered to
anonymize user data, however, this is expected to substan-
tially increase the network load and computation time.
5.3 Analysis
In this section, we analyze the privacy implications of IoT
intrusion detection system for two important features, the
data type used for collaboration, and the system architec-
ture.
Firstly, the system architecture of the detection system
determines how data is transferred by the entities in the
detection systems. Standalone detection system installed on
the user device (e.g. IoT device) or installed at the edge
router (entry point router to smart home or the corporate
network) operate locally by recording data from the single
source, only use data from the single source, therefore,
does not have high performance accuracy. The collaborative
system, however, operates in two modes i.e. the centralized
architecture [44] [15] [56], and the distributed architecture
[48] [49] [57]. In the centralized setup, it is envisaged to
protect the privacy and integrity of the data provided to
it. However, it may not be ideal as the attacker has to
compromise only one device to breach the privacy of all col-
laborators. Furthermore, the centralized system introduces
the challenge of single point of failure, which may inhibit
efficient collaboration in case of failure.
The transfer of data to other parties or centralized system
has a risk of privacy. In this setting, the collaborating device
can operate in four settings: 1) transfer all raw data to
the centralized system or other devices that process all the
data for meaningful decision. This setting does not have
any privacy assurance as data is exposed at other entity
whilst also increasing computational workload, 2) transfer
processed data for instance exchanging traffic statistics of
host or IP-address, however, it still carries privacy threat
but without requiring significant additional resources, and
3) the encrypted exchange of data. This setting assures
privacy-preservation but requires extensive computation
and communication overhead for the exchange of encrypted
data.
Overall, privacy is an important feature which should be
guaranteed by intrusion detection system especially within
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a collaborative system. However, our analysis of the exist-
ing literature reveals that the research community has not
given much attention to privacy preserving collaboration
among the IoT domains or IoT devices. This may be due
to resource-constrained nature of IoT devices which limits
alert information and cryptographic processing of data due
to computational overheads.
6 ANALYSIS OF CURRENT IDS APPROACHES
In order to conduct a rigorous and methodical analysis
of contemporary literature presented in the section 4, we
have applied a thorough criteria with metrics, which are
significant for effective intrusion detection for IoT. The indi-
vidual element of the criteria along with a brief explanation
are presented below. The comparative analysis of existing
approaches for these criteria is presented in Table 1.
• Placement: As with the contemporary computing
systems, the placement of an intrusion detection
system is crucial as it determines the level of visibility
it can offer to the activities within the monitored sys-
tem. For instance, a network-based IDS is limited to
monitoring the network traffic originated or destined
for the monitored host and, therefore, cannot monitor
any process subversion or privilege escalation within
the monitored host. This is increasingly important for
IoT systems with recent studies highlighting the lack
of protection for IoT devices [77]. Furthermore, our
analysis of existing intrusion detection approaches
for IoT highlights that majority of these approaches
are network-based, which restricts the depth of
events visible to such systems. In view of emerging
malware, such as Botnets, visibility of system-level
events, including system calls is important to protect
against such threats.
• Detection Time frame: One of the important char-
acteristic of IoT systems is the dynamic nature of
the system with the participating nodes following an
adhoc pattern. Therefore, the time-frame of detection
becomes even more important with the objective to
detect an attack as soon as possible to avoid spread-
ing infection to wider devices. Through analysis of
existing literature, we have identified that majority
of existing approaches are established and evalu-
ated within isolated environments which has two-
fold impact; i) the implementation and evaluation
does not accurately represent an IoT environment,
and ii) experimentation results conducted in isolated,
simulated environment, such as Matlab or Contiki do
not accurately simulate the challenges encountered
within an real-world IoT environment. Therefore,
majority of existing approaches are limited to offline
detection which inhibits an IDS’s ability to protect
against malicious threats in timely manner.
• Detection Engine: An IDS can utilize a variety of
detection engines, such as anomaly, signature and
game based as highlighted in section 4. The choice
of detection engine has two-fold impact i.e. i) it can
affect the ability of an IDS to detect attacks, and ii)
it impacts the performance overhead incurred by the
engine. For instance, although signature-based IDS
have been identified to be resource efficient, they
do not have the ability to detect zero-day attacks.
Analysis of literature presented in section 4 and
summarized in Table 2 highlights that although exist-
ing approaches use variety of techniques, however,
it also identifies an increase in the use of artificial
intelligence and deep learning to achieve effective
intrusion detection. In view of the extraordinary
increase in volume and variety of attacks for IoT
systems, these developments highlight future trends
and require further advancements to fulfil the poten-
tial of these technological advancements.
• Architecture: The system architecture of an IDS spec-
ifies how the detection system carried out its de-
tection functions. The system architecture not only
affects the detection accuracy and performance but
also affects user privacy. The standalone detection
system mainly operates at the local machine or
the device thereby susceptible to extended detection
time because of the non-availability of enough data
and stealthy nature of the attacker. However, a col-
laborative architecture utilizes data from different
sources, such as IoT devices or network devices
within the same or different organization. It can im-
prove the detection accuracy, however, it introduces
the challenge of privacy of the data shared between
the entities. Furthermore, with regards to detection
accuracy and performance, a typical IoT system is
comprised of a number of IoT devices arranged into a
local network such as a LoWPAN and an edge router
which manages communication between local net-
work and the Internet. Within this context, existing
approaches can be categorized based on the location
of the IDS module with distributed referring to IDS
module implemented on IoT devices and centralized
referring to IDS module implemented at the edge
router. In this context, analysis of literature highlights
emergence of schemes, which take into account dis-
tributed nature of a typical IoT architecture through
collaboration between IoT devices and edge routers
[17], [36]. We believe collaborative approaches can
be beneficial in protecting against large-scale attacks,
however, further work is required to enhance exist-
ing efforts to achieve effective and timely detection.
• Performance Overhead: A typical IoT device is
constrained with respect to resources available for
compute-hungry processes, such as intrusion detec-
tion. Therefore, we believe performance overhead
caused by an IDS is one of the important criterion
and can be measured in the form of energy consump-
tion or CPU usage by the IDS. Our study of literature
has highlighted that majority of existing approaches
do not take into account performance overhead
whilst evaluation effectiveness of these approaches.
We believe, due to the resource-constrained nature of
IoT devices, this is an important criteria to assess ef-
fectiveness of an IDS for IoT, and therefore, identifies
a gap in literature which requires further efforts by
the research community.
• Attack types: We have presented a comprehensive
discussion about the potential attacks within an IoT
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system supported by an attack model. These differ-
ent types of attacks can be detected at different levels
(network or host) and using different approaches,
such as anomaly and signature-based. Furthermore,
review of literature has also highlighted emergence
of novel attack types, such as Botnets, which exploit
specific vulnerabilities within a typical IoT system,
and therefore, require further efforts to achieve effec-
tive protection mechanisms.
• Detection Performance: Detection performance rep-
resents the rate of with which an IDS can successfully
detect a malicious attempt. It is one of the fundamen-
tal attributes of an IDS as it can be directly aligned
to its effectiveness. Analysis of existing approaches
summarized in Table 2 highlights that majority of
these approaches report high detection performance
in terms of detection accuracy, FPR and TPR. How-
ever, as highlighted earlier, a significant number of
current efforts are implemented and evaluated in
isolated environment which do not accurately reflect
a real-world IoT environment and therefore require
further efforts to address this limitation.
• Scalability: Typically, the number of devices within
an IoT system is significantly higher compared with
contemporary systems. In order to address the sig-
nificant number of devices involved, the scalability
of the IDS is an important criteria. As highlighted in
Table 2, a number of existing efforts have adopted a
centralized approach which affects scalability of such
efforts and therefore require further work to address
this limitation.
7 OPEN CHALLENGES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
As part of this research, we have performed a thorough
review of existing efforts to address one of the critical
aspects of IoT security i.e. intrusion detection. In previous
sections, we have presented a comprehensive account of the
state of the art within this domain and a thorough compar-
ative analysis of individual approaches. In this section, we
highlight important future research directions which require
further investigation and efforts to improve overall security
of an IoT system.
1) Constrained resources: A typical IoT device has
limited resources such as constrained processing
power, low storage capacity, and limited battery
power. Within this context, resource-hungry intru-
sion detection system would drain the resources
of an IoT system. Therefore, it is important to
have a Intrusion detection system that fulfills two
important characteristics: 1) any IDS should not
incur significant computational and communication
overhead, and 2) IDS should achieve high detection
accuracy. In particular, the use of anomaly-based de-
tection systems [50] [49] [48] requires considerably
higher resources than the signature-based detection
systems while having a trade-off between detection
accuracy and overheads. For instance, anomaly de-
tection is particularly effective against previously
unknown attacks, but is expected to incur signifi-
cant performance overhead. As an attempt to ex-
plore opportunities within this context, we have
formulated a collaborative intrusion detection sys-
tem in [69], which aims to use both anomaly and
signature-based detection engines to achieve perfor-
mance efficiency without compromising detection
accuracy.
Our analysis has revealed that many of the exist-
ing systems have not been designed for resource-
constrained devices, however these approaches
mainly focused on increasing the detection accuracy
with small false positive. We believe there should
be trade-off among three important factors 1) high
detection accuracy, 2) performance overheads, and
3) privacy-preservation. Furthermore, dedicated ef-
forts are required to devise approaches considering
resource constraints that primarily focus on the en-
ergy consumption agnostic of resources and mem-
ory consumption.
2) Multi-stage attacks: A typical intrusion is carried
out over multiple stage, each attempting to exploit
a specific vulnerability. Such sophisticated attacks
are termed as multi-stage attacks, and are common
mechanisms for traditional and emerging comput-
ing systems such as IoT. Existing detection systems
for IoT solely focus on the detection of individual
threats agnostic of potential relationships between
them. We believe the dynamic nature of the IoT
systems makes the challenge of multi-stage attack
detection non-trivial requiring explicit efforts to ad-
dress it. Jun and Chi [21] represent one of the initial
effort which recognize and explicitly seek to detect
relationships between different malicious incidents.
However, it represents a limited effort and further
work is required to address detection and protection
against multi-stage attacks within the IoT systems.
3) Device protection: As identified by [77], one of core
issues with respect to the security of IoT systems
is the security of the device as ”it is often neglected
by the manufacturers and usually an afterthought”.
The lack of protection at device level within such
systems has resulted in significant security attacks
such as Mirai botnet in 2016 [38] and its more
recent versions, such as Brickerbot [78] and Reaper
[79]. In order to protect against such threats device-
level security measures are paramount which can
protect IoT systems. One such measure can be an
effective intrusion detection installed within the IoT
device. Through our research, we have identified
efforts, such as [43] and [69], which propose to
develop intrusion detection capability within the
device however these efforts are generally limited
in that these require further refinement to take into
account unique characteristics of IoT devices such
as those explained earlier in this section.
4) Large-scale attacks: With the widespread adoption
of IoT systems, the number of IoT devices are in-
creasing exponentially with some estimates predict-
ing more than 50 billion IoT devices by the year
2020. The impact of this growth on securing the IoT
system is is two-folds; firstly, the enormous scale
makes IoT systems a lucrative target for malicious
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actors, and secondly, it also presents IoT systems as
a resource which can be used to launch a large-scale
attacks. An example of such attacks is the botnets i.e.
Mirai botnet and Brickerbot launched a Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) which compromised the
Domain Name System (DNS) service [38]. More-
over, due to the nature of the IoT systems, routing
attacks are typically contagious i.e. affecting all the
devices within a LoWPAN. These attacks demand a
holistic approach to the intrusion detection which is
able to monitor and detect the state of the overall
network as well as the individual devices.
5) Limited experimentation and evaluation: In or-
der to assess the effectiveness of intrusion detec-
tion efforts, rigorous experimentation is required
for integrating multiple dimensions of the evalua-
tion. Although, experiments have been conducted
to demonstrate the effectiveness with respect to
detection accuracy and false positive rate, but this
evaluation is performed without using appropri-
ate simulation software or hardware to replicate
a real-life IoT setting. For instance, a number of
efforts have used KDD 99 dataset [80] within an
isolated environment to conduct experimentation,
however, it has multiple limitations i.e. 1) the KDD
99 dataset does not accurately reflect the current
threat types prevalent for the IoT systems and, 2)
conducting evaluation in an isolated environment
prohibits taking into account important factors such
as resource constraints of a typical IoT device. These
challenges require explicit efforts to improve state
of the art with respect to the evaluation of intrusion
detection schemes within IoT systems. Further, we
believe that research into dedicated honeypots for
IoT systems is required and will be significant in
facilitating thorough evaluation of future intrusion
detection approaches.
6) Unavailability of accurate data: Through our re-
search, we have identified unavailability of real-
world data from an IoT system as one of the bot-
tlenecks to achieve rigorous evaluation. In absence
of such data, a number of current approaches have
used KDD99 datasets, which contains network traf-
fic data for contemporary computing systems. We
believe further research into dedicated honeypots
for IoT systems is required and will be significant in
facilitating thorough evaluation of future intrusion
detection approaches.
8 CONCLUSIONS
Connected IoT provide foundation for next generation of
infrastructures to facilitate development of future cities
which are inherently sustainable with applications across
smart homes, smart health and smart buildings. However,
alongside the extraordinary evolution of IoT devices, the
volume and variety of security threats for such systems have
increased manifold, highlighting the importance of an effi-
cient intrusion detection system. This paper has presented a
comprehensive review of existing efforts within this domain
aiming to identify open challenges and future directions.
The paper has provided new focus on the performance
overhead, energy consumption and privacy implications
incurred by existing approaches. Highlighting challenges
surrounding these aspects, this review has attempted to
enthuse researchers to address key challenges identified in
this article to achieve effective intrusion detection for IoT
systems.
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